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13 April 1960

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA


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South Africa: [Black African nationalists in the Johannesburg area may call a week-long work stoppage beginning on 18 April. Their two main nationalist groups, now outlawed, have reportedly joined forces and are planning to use gangster elements to intimidate the labor force. The Afrikaner population in the area, whose temper is reportedly at the breaking point after the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd, can be expected to react violently to any further mass demonstrations.]

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Philippines: [President Garcia's recent statement that he would like to see the most modern American weapons, including guided missiles and atomic weapons, stationed in the Philippines, is an abrupt switch from the nationalistic policy he has been following. Garcia, with an eye on the presidential elections next year, may feel that the friction he has fostered in Philippine-American relations may boomerang politically.]

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(Page 3)

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NO
Laos: [The government apparently believes that only one or two Communists should be permitted to win seats in the 24 April National Assembly elections.] Peiping has joined Hanoi in repeating Pathet Lao threats of increased violence in Laos if the elections are "nonrepresentative" of the people's wishes. [redacted]

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NO
Turkey-USSR: Announcement of an exchange of visits this summer between Turkish Premier Menderes and Soviet Premier Khrushchev follows persistent efforts by the USSR since early 1960 to secure Turkish agreement for such visits. The Turks apparently have accepted the exchange in an effort to keep pace with some of their NATO allies in current attempts toward improved East-West relations. The move will probably generate added pressures on Iran and Greece for improved relations with the USSR. [redacted]

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Afghanistan: [Reports continue of a call-up of certain classes of reserves in the Afghan Army and the augmentation of garrisons in the tribal area adjacent to the Pakistan border. Such reports indicate that the tense situation which has persisted among the tribes since last October has still not been resolved. In addition, Kabul may be anticipating an expansion of Pakistani-inspired antigovernment activities among the nomadic Afghan tribes who return from Pakistan each spring.] [redacted] (Page 6)

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13 Apr 60

ii

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Further Antigovernment Demonstrations Planned in South Africa

[Black African nationalists in the Johannesburg area may call a week-long work stoppage beginning on 18 April. Remnants of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which have been outlawed since 8 April, have reportedly joined in an underground coalition under a PAC leader, Walter Jolobo, and are planning to use gangster elements to intimidate the labor force. Widespread demonstrations may occur on 15 April, Africa Freedom Day.]

[The African campaign will meet determined opposition from the white population, particularly from the dominant Afrikaner (Dutch-descended) community. Afrikaners in the Transvaal, whose tempers are reportedly at the breaking point after the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd, can be expected to react violently to any further mass demonstrations. In addition, the Afrikaner-controlled government has apparently decided to increase the intensity of its drive for total racial separation, in an effort to reduce the economy's present overwhelming dependence on African labor. Government spokesmen have stated that the system of "cheap black labor" will have to be "drastically revised," and that more of the 500,000 Asians in the country should do manual work.]

[If this intensified apartheid program is implemented, the Union's English-descended community, which dominates South African industry and thus has the greatest present stake in the retention of the African labor pool, will probably increase its opposition to the government's program of racial separation. The English may be joined by moderate Afrikaners in the Cape Town area, who have recently criticized fundamental aspects of apartheid.]

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[REDACTED]
Philippine President's Bid for US Missile and Nuclear
Weapons Bases

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[President Garcia's press statement on 9 April that he would welcome the stationing in the Philippines of the most modern American weapons, including guided missiles and atomic weapons, was apparently made without the prior knowledge of Philippine cabinet or other high officials. The care and elaborateness with which he expounded his argument suggests, however, that he had given the matter considerable thought.]

[The Philippine Congress is giving strong bipartisan support to Garcia's statement, and press reaction has been equally favorable. The Defense Department reportedly has received messages from veterans' groups throughout the Philippines unqualifiedly supporting Garcia's position. Secretary of Defense Santos has stated that in the current ideological struggle there is no substitute for military preparedness.]

[Garcia, with an eye on the 1961 presidential elections, may feel that the friction he has fostered in Philippine-American relations could boomerang politically. The relatively weak appeal of the administration's "Filipino First" slogan in the November 1959 senatorial elections and the defeat of the Nacionalista candidates most closely identified with Garcia have probably convinced him that an issue with considerable appeal is necessary. He may have decided that a renewed emphasis on close US-Philippine defense ties and military preparedness, particularly if underwritten by the United States, will serve his purpose.]

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Laotian Government Considering Rigging Elections
Against Communists

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[The Laotian election committee will reportedly meet on 16 April to decide which Communist candidate or possibly two candidates will be allowed to win National Assembly seats in the 24 April elections,]

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[The government estimates that completely free elections would give the 20 to 25 Communist or pro-Communist candidates seven of the 59 seats at stake.]

[An American Embassy official who recently toured Champasak Province in southern Laos reports a general local assumption that all six government candidates will win because the police and the army are effectively persuading the people, sometimes through threats, that it would be unsafe to vote for opposition candidates. At least four of the government candidates, including Deputy Prime Minister Nhouy, are said to be having difficulty generating popular enthusiasm. The embassy officer believes that in a reasonably free election, two or three of the six seats at stake in Champassak would go to opposition candidates.]

[Communist pre-election tactics appear to have been predicated on the hope that, despite the small number of Communist and pro-Communist candidates, a small leftist bloc headed by the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) could be elected. Should Communist hopes be disappointed, an intensification of guerrilla warfare by the Pathet Lao insurgents is likely. The threat of increased violence in Laos if the elections are "non-representative" of the people's wishes was implicit in the latest NLHS statement on the elections, which was summarized in considerable detail by Hanoi and Peiping radios on 9 and 11 April, respectively.]

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[redacted]
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Turkish and Soviet Premiers to Exchange Visits

Simultaneous announcements in Ankara and Moscow on 12 April that Premier Menderes would visit Moscow in July and Premier Khrushchev would make a return visit to Turkey at a later date mark the successful conclusion of persistent Soviet attempts since early 1960 for a high-level exchange of visits. [T]urkish officials had been reluctant to accept the Soviet suggestion, fearing its effect on some of Turkey's allies-- particularly Iran. There have been indications for some time, however, that officials in Ankara have resented what they consider criticism from some NATO allies that Turkey has been provocative toward the USSR in an era marked by growing contacts between East and West. The proposed exchange is regarded as an attempt by Turkey to keep pace with other Western states in their efforts to bring about some relaxation of tensions. Turkish officials have stressed, however, that the decision to accept the Soviet proposal does not represent any change in Ankara's firm anti-Communist foreign policy and that no significant results are anticipated as a result of the visits.]

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Reaction to the announcement within Turkey is expected to be generally favorable, as the exchange will tend to be interpreted as recognition of Turkey's international standing. Ingrained distrust of the USSR among the Turkish people, combined with political maneuvering in preparation for possible elections later this year, however, may arouse some internal criticism of the move.

Officials in Greece have already indicated fear that the announcement will cause difficulties for the Karamanlis government, which has consistently refused similar Soviet requests for a high-level exchange of visits. Opposition parties within Greece and bloc representatives in Athens can be expected to exploit Turkey's acceptance of the proposed visits in urging improved relations between Greece and the Soviet bloc. Similarly, Iran, which has had severely strained relations with the USSR during the past year, will be under increased pressure to improve relations with Moscow. [redacted]

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Kabul Apprehensive Over Possible Tribal Unrest During Spring Migration

[The Afghan Government's apprehension over possible tribal disorders during the annual spring migration of nomadic Afghan tribes which traditionally winter on the plains of Pakistan has reportedly led the Kabul regime to continue the recall of reserves released from the army during the past three years. There is no indication at present of the extent of the call-up, but civilians with bedding rolls were observed being organized into units in Kabul on 11 April.]

[The returning tribesmen, always a potential source of trouble, are cause for special concern in Kabul this year in view of the already strong and continuing reaction in the tribal areas to Kabul's efforts at reform and modernization. In addition, worsened relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the Pushtoonistan question cause Kabul to fear that some of the returning tribesmen have been subverted by the Pakistanis. Afghan army units, which during 1959 were increasingly deployed into the tribal areas adjacent to Pakistan in an effort to assert Kabul's authority, are reported also guarding the routes traditionally taken by the nomads.]

[In the past, Kabul has given every indication of intending to suppress disorders in the tribal areas with dramatic displays of military power. so as to prevent them from spreading. Afghan Prime Minister Daud's absence from the country is not likely to result in any less forceful a response in the event of trouble this spring.]

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

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
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